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 DEATH PENALTY APPEALS AND HABEAS 
PROCEEDINGS: THE CALIFORNIA 
EXPERIENCE 
GERALD F. UELMEN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
I am especially delighted to participate in the Marquette University Law 
School Conference on Criminal Appeals because it is a homecoming of sorts 
for me.  Sixty-eight years ago, I was born in Greendale, Wisconsin, just two 
miles south of Milwaukee.  My godfather, Robert Nystrom, was starting his 
second year of law school here at Marquette in 1943 when he enlisted in the 
Army Air Corps.  He served as a navigator on a B-17 bomber, flying missions 
out of Seething, England, for the Eighth Air Force.  Three weeks after D-Day, 
he and his crew went down while flying their second mission.  He never came 
home.  I have always felt especially blessed that I was able to pursue the legal 
career he never had, and that he made it possible for me to do so.  He is still 
my hero. 
Five years ago, I was appointed to serve as executive director for the 
California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, created by the 
California Senate Rules Committee.  At the time, I did not realize I was being 
invited to a wake.  Although the Commission was remarkably successful in 
achieving consensus to fulfill its charge—to make recommendations designed 
to ensure that the application of criminal justice in California is just, fair, and 
accurate—and was remarkably successful in marshaling seven of its proposals 
through the California legislature, every one of those proposals was vetoed by 
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.
1
  We learned that having law 
enforcement participation on the Commission, and having unanimous 
Commission support for our recommendations, did not guarantee law 
enforcement support when these measures landed on the Governor‘s desk.2  
And our current governor was apparently more impressed by the opposition of 
 
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. 
1. See CAL. COMM‘N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (2008), 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].   
2. Commissioners included former Police Chief William Bratton of Los Angeles, former 
Sacramento County Sheriff and California Highway Patrol Commissioner Glen Craig, and Police 
Chief Pete Dunbar of Pleasant Hill, California.  The Commission was chaired by former California 
Attorney General John Van de Kamp, and included three present or former county district attorneys.  
Id. at 1, 3–5, 7, 9.  
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the California Police Chiefs Association and the California State Sheriffs‘ 
Association than by the recommendations of our Commission.  Although this 
was a frustrating experience, I fully realize that criminal law reform is not a 
sport for the short-winded.  I am confident that the election of a new governor 
will lead to full implementation of our Commission‘s proposals to improve 
eyewitness identification procedures, require the recording of police 
interrogations, require the corroboration of jail snitch testimony, improve 
standards for forensic science, require the reporting of prosecutorial 
misconduct to the state bar, and support the reintegration of the exonerated 
innocent into society.  I am less optimistic about the effect of our report on the 
administration of California‘s death penalty law.  The reform of California‘s 
death penalty law will take more than the election of a new governor.  Our 
death penalty law was adopted by initiative, and in California an initiative 
measure can be amended only by a subsequent initiative.
3
  Thus, death penalty 
reform will require a vote of the people, and the level of popular support for 
the death penalty in California remains at 63% according to a recent poll.
4
 
Despite spending more than any other state on its implementation and 
administration, California today is saddled with a death penalty law that can 
be described only as completely dysfunctional.  We have the longest death 
row in America, with approximately 670 inmates awaiting execution.
5
  
Typically, the lapse of time between sentence and execution is twenty-five 
years, twice the national average, and is growing wider each year.
6
   
One hundred nineteen inmates have spent more than twenty years on 
California‘s death row.7  Most of them will certainly die before they are ever 
executed.  Since restoration of the death penalty in 1978, the leading cause of 
death on California‘s death row has been death by natural causes (38), 
followed by suicides (14) and executions (13).
8
  For all practical purposes, a 
sentence of death in California is a sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.  The only difference is that the individual serves the life 
sentence on death row, while the state forks out millions of dollars to process 
appeals and habeas corpus proceedings.  Additionally, the cost of confinement 
is quadruple what it would be if the individual was serving the life sentence in 
a maximum security prison, where those sentenced to life imprisonment 
 
3. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10 (West 2008). 
4. Mark DiCamillo & Mervin Field, While Still Strongly Supporting the Death Penalty, 
Californians Have Mixed Views on Some Aspects of Capital Punishment, The Field Poll (Mar. 3, 
2006), available at http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/RLS2183.pdf. 
5. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 120–21.  On July 1, 2008, ―[t]he next two largest death rows 
after California were Florida with 397 and Texas with 393.‖  Id. at 124 n.32.  
6. Id. at 122–23. 
7. Id. at 125. 
8. Id. at 120–21. 
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normally serve their sentences.
9
  How did we create this mess? 
In constructing our machinery of death, we took four steps in California 
that inexorably led us into our current morass.  First, we enacted the broadest 
death penalty law in America, with an array of special circumstances that can 
be applied to 87% of the murders committed in California.
10
  There is nothing 
―special‖ about special circumstances under California‘s death penalty law.  
Special circumstances, for example, include murders perpetrated in the 
commission of twelve different felonies, regardless of whether the defendant 
was the person who actually perpetrated the murder.
11
  Second, we gave fifty-
eight locally elected county prosecutors complete discretion to determine 
which murders should be prosecuted as death penalty cases.  Our Commission 
discovered tremendous disparity among the various counties in California in 
the degree to which the death penalty was utilized.  In San Francisco, two 
successive district attorneys have been elected on a pledge that they will never 
employ the death penalty.
12
  In more rural counties, district attorneys are 
regularly elected and reelected on a pledge they will employ the death penalty 
as frequently as possible.
13
  As a result, the numbers of new death judgments 
in California soon escalated beyond the capacity of courts to keep up.  For the 
twenty years between 1980 and 2000, California averaged thirty-two new 
death judgments each year.
14
 
Third, we enshrined this statutory scheme in an initiative measure, which 
rendered it virtually impossible to narrow the application of the law by 
legislative amendment.
15
  Fourth, we purged our state supreme court of 
justices who attempted to narrow the application of California‘s death penalty 
law by means of statutory interpretation.  From 1978 until 1986, the 
California Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rose Bird affirmed only 8% of 
the death judgments it reviewed, imposing stringent requirements upon the 
 
9. The California Department of Corrections estimates that the cost of confinement on death 
row is $90,000 per inmate per year in excess of the cost of maximum security confinement for a 
prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment.  This alone accounts for $63.3 million annually.  Id. at 141.  
10. Id. at 120. 
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17) (West 2008); People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306, 1326–
28 (Cal. 1987). 
12. Glen L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on 
Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990–1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 26 n.128 
(2005). 
13. See id. at 38.  Counties with the highest death penalty rates tended to have the highest 
proportion of non-Hispanic whites in their population and the lowest population density.  Id.  For 
instance, excluding counties in which fewer than five death sentences were imposed, death 
sentencing ratios varied from 0.0058 death sentences per homicide committed in Los Angeles 
County to a rate nearly ten times higher in rural Shasta County, which recorded a 0.05 death 
sentencing ratio.  Id. at 27–28 tbl.8. 
14. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 120. 
15. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10 (West 2008). 
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jury instructions to be given in felony murder special circumstance cases.
16
  In 
the November election of 1986, California voters removed Chief Justice Bird 
and Associate Justices Cruz Reynoso and Joseph Grodin from office,
17
 largely 
on the campaign claim that votes against these three would be three votes in 
favor of the death penalty.  The election results had a profound effect upon 
their successors.  From 1986 to 1996, the California Supreme Court under 
Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas affirmed 94% of the death judgments it 
reviewed.
18
 
II.  DIRECT APPEALS 
As in nearly all death penalty states, judgments of death in California are 
directly appealed to the state supreme court, without intervention by the 
intermediate courts of appeal.  This means that death cases are the only 
portion of its docket over which the California Supreme Court has no direct 
control.  All other cases are heard only upon the grant of a petition for hearing 
by the court; with respect to death cases, the court has no discretion to deny 
direct review.  Because nearly all death cases involve indigent appellants, the 
first step in processing these appeals is the appointment of counsel to 
represent the appellant.  The high number of death judgments in California 
greatly exceeds the available pool of qualified attorneys who are competent 
and willing to accept appointments to handle the direct appeals. 
In 1976, the California legislature created the State Public Defender‘s 
Office to handle all indigent criminal appeals.
19
  In the early 1990s, the 
governor asked the office to restrict itself to capital cases.
20
  In 1997, the 
legislature expanded the office to 128 funded positions in order to alleviate 
the growing backlog of death penalty appointments.
21
  The backlog was 
reduced from 170 death row inmates without counsel to handle their direct 
appeals to 79.
22
  But in 2003, the budget of the State Public Defender suffered 
a cut of 41 positions, and another 10% cut was sustained in 2009.
23
  The office 
currently handles 125 automatic appeals for death row inmates, but cannot 
accept any additional appointments.
24
  The remaining death row inmates who 
 
16. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 120 n.21 (citing Gerald F. Uelmen, Review of Death 
Penalty Judgments by the Supreme Courts of California: A Tale of Two Courts, 23 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 237, 237 (1989)). 
17. Uelmen, supra note 16, at 238. 
18. Id. at 247, 257.  
19. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 132. 
20. Id.  
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id.  
24. Id. 
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have counsel for their direct appeals are represented by private lawyers who 
accept appointments to handle death row appeals at a rate of $145 per 
allowable hour.
25
  ―A lawyer must have four years of active practice of law, 
including service as counsel of record in seven completed felony appeals 
including at least one murder case, or service as counsel of record in five 
completed felony appeals and service as supervised counsel in two death 
penalty appeals.  Completion of training and demonstrated proficiency in 
appellate skills is also required.‖26  The California Supreme Court sets 
benchmarks to create presumptions regarding how many hours are allowable 
for a given task.  Lawyers handling death appeals complain the benchmarks 
are set too low, and the hassle of challenging them is demeaning and time-
consuming.  At least twenty of the lawyers handling death appeals can no 
longer afford to live in California, and have relocated to other states.  The 
Commission concluded that the level of experience required and the rigorous 
demands of death appeals have led to a significant decline in the pool of 
attorneys available to handle death penalty appeals.
27
 
There is currently a delay of three to five years before a death row inmate 
has counsel appointed to handle his or her direct appeal.
28
  ―Once counsel is 
appointed, he . . . must read the record which averages in excess of 9,000 
pages of Reporter‘s and Clerk‘s transcripts, research the law, and then file an 
opening brief with the Court. The average delay between appointment of 
counsel and the filing of the opening brief is 2.74 years.‖29  The responsive 
brief of the attorney general is usually filed within six months, and a reply 
brief is then filed, again usually within six months.  Then, the parties wait for 
the California Supreme Court to schedule oral arguments.
30
 
As of July 1, 2008, eighty defendants were awaiting oral arguments before 
the California Supreme Court regarding their fully briefed death appeals.
31
  
The court ordinarily hears twenty to twenty-five of these cases a year.  
Current efforts to push this number to thirty cases per year already are 
seriously impacting the court‘s ability to hear other cases.  As a result, most 
appeals languish in the court for two years or more, and death cases usually 
languish for three years before being scheduled for oral argument.  Once a 
case has been orally argued and submitted, the California Supreme Court is 
required to issue its decision within ninety days.
32
 
 
25. Id.  
26. Id.; see also CAL. CT. R. 8.605(d).  
27. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 132. 
28. Id. at 131. 
29. Id.  
30. Id. 
31. Id.  
32. Id. 
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The delay in hearing fully briefed cases has led California Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Ronald George to propose an amendment to the California 
constitution to permit the court to transfer fully briefed death cases to the 
intermediate courts of appeal for decision, with discretionary review of the 
court of appeal decision available in the California Supreme Court.
33
  No 
action has been taken on this proposal.  Even if adopted, concern has been 
expressed that it would increase rather than shorten the delay in deciding 
direct appeals, and require dispersion of the staff the supreme court has 
assembled to process death appeals.  The California Commission on the Fair 
Administration of Justice endorsed the proposal, but only if its other 
recommendations for full funding of counsel were approved.  The 
Commission recommended a one-third increase in the budget of the State 
Public Defender to enable the office to accept eighteen to twenty new 
appointments each year.  ―The current backlog of [seventy-nine] 
unrepresented death row inmates could be reduced to a one year wait if the 
number of new death judgments does not begin to increase again.‖34  But, as 
previously noted, there are currently no limits on the discretion of locally 
elected district attorneys to file murder charges as death penalty cases. 
An example of the dysfunctional delays in direct appeals recently was 
presented to the California Supreme Court in People v. Burgener.
35
  Burgener 
was sentenced to death in 1981 for a robbery murder committed in 1980.
36
  At 
the time, he was thirty years old.
37
  By the time of this opinion‘s writing, 
Burgener was fifty-eight years old, and his direct appeals had not yet been 
concluded.  As the court noted, this was the fourth published opinion on 
appeal, ―and it may not be the last.‖38  In 1986, his conviction was affirmed 
but the death penalty was reversed because of ineffective assistance of 
counsel at the penalty phase.  The case was remanded for a new penalty 
hearing, at which he was again sentenced to death.  The trial judge granted a 
modification from death to life, but that modification was reversed by the 
intermediate court of appeal on an appeal by the prosecution.  On remand, the 
case was assigned to a new judge, who again sentenced Burgener to death.
39
  
Twelve years later, the California Supreme Court reversed that judgment 
 
33. News Release, Judicial Council of California, Supreme Court Proposes Amendments to 
Constitutions in Death Penalty Appeals (Nov. 19, 2007), available at 
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/newsreleases/NR76-07.PDF.  
34. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 133. 
35. 206 P.3d 420 (Cal. 2009). 
36. Id. at 422. 
37. See People v. Burgener, 62 P.3d 1, 16–18 (Cal. 2003) (noting that the defendant‘s first 
conviction was in 1969, when he was nineteen years old). 
38. Burgener, 206 P.3d at 422. 
39. Id. 
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because the judge failed to exercise his independent judgment.  On remand, 
the judge again imposed the death penalty after the defendant waived counsel 
and agreed to represent himself.  On appeal, the supreme court again vacated 
the death judgment, concluding that the record was insufficient to show the 
waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent.
40
  The case was then 
remanded for another hearing on modification of the death sentence, to be 
heard by yet another trial judge because the second trial judge had passed 
away.
41
  Thus, after twenty-eight years, the direct appeal has yet to be 
determined.  Only then will habeas corpus review commence.  It is likely to 
be another ten to twelve years before all proceedings in state and federal court 
have been concluded in Burgener‘s case.  At that point, he will be seventy 
years old, if he is still alive.  His confinement on death row for forty years will 
have cost the State of California $3,680,000 more than if he had been 
confined pursuant to a sentence of life without parole. 
III.  STATE HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 
Review on direct appeal is, of course, limited to the record compiled by 
trial counsel in the court below.  In nearly every death case, the adequacy of 
performance of the trial counsel will be among the most significant issues to 
be litigated.  Was the case fully investigated, and did counsel make all the 
efforts that a reasonably competent defense lawyer would make under the 
circumstances?  There may also be issues of prosecutorial misconduct that are 
not fully illuminated by the trial court record.  Was there potentially 
exculpatory evidence (including evidence which might persuade a jury to opt 
for life imprisonment rather than death) which was not disclosed to the 
defense?  These issues are normally litigated in a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, in which counsel independently investigates what trial counsel did and 
did not do, and what was and was not turned over by the prosecution. 
While California provides appointed counsel to represent death row 
inmates in state habeas corpus proceedings, currently 291 death row inmates 
do not have habeas counsel.
42
  The average wait to have habeas counsel 
appointed is eight to ten years after imposition of sentence.
43
 Although the 
same lawyer could conceivably handle both the direct appeal and the habeas 
proceeding, lawyers are generally unwilling to accept appointment for both.  
California law now requires separate counsel for the direct appeal and the 
habeas proceeding, unless the prisoner and counsel request representation by 
 
40. Id. at 422–23. 
41. Id. at 430. 
42. Much of the information in Parts III & IV has been adapted directly from the Commission‘s 
Final Report.  For a more in-depth discussion, see FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 134–37. 
43. Id. at 134. 
502 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:495 
the same attorney in both aspects of the capital case.
44
 
Private lawyers appointed to handle habeas claims must meet 
qualifications similar to those required for appointment to handle direct 
appeals,
45
 and are paid at the same rate.  A recently increased maximum of 
$50,000 is available to cover expenses, but lawyers complain even this 
amount is not sufficient to cover the costs of investigation and necessary 
experts.  A total of 141 habeas petitions are currently being handled by private 
court-appointed counsel.  In 1998, the California legislature established the 
California Habeas Corpus Resource Center (HCRC) to employ up to thirty-
four attorneys to handle death penalty habeas corpus petitions in state and 
federal court.  With an annual budget of $14.9 million, HCRC now represents 
seventy clients in state habeas corpus proceedings.
46
 
The delay in disposing of death penalty habeas petitions could be 
eliminated if habeas counsel were appointed at the same time as counsel for 
the direct appeal.  Currently, however, habeas counsel is usually not appointed 
until the direct appeal is completed.  Counsel then has three years to file the 
habeas petition.  The average delay between the filing of a fully briefed 
petition and a decision by the California Supreme Court is twenty-two 
months.
47
  As of this writing, the supreme court had 100 fully briefed death 
penalty habeas petitions on its docket, awaiting decision.  The habeas 
petitions are routinely decided without a response from the attorney general 
and without a formal hearing.  The court simply issues a summary order, 
declaring that even if true, the allegations in the petition would not merit 
relief.  Out of 689 state habeas petitions decided by the California Supreme 
Court in death cases since 1978, the court has issued orders to show cause 
requiring the attorney general to respond to the petition in only 57 cases, and 
ordered evidentiary hearings before a pro tem judge in only 31 cases.
48
  As a 
result, the federal courts deciding subsequent federal habeas corpus claims 
rarely have factual findings to review. 
IV.  FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 
A state prisoner may file an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 
federal court ―on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.‖49  Federal courts can 
grant a request for the appointment of counsel, who can be paid and 
 
44. CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 68663 (West 2008). 
45. CAL. CT. R. 8.605(e).  
46. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 134–35. 
47. Id. at 134. 
48. Id.  
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006). 
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reimbursed for expenses from federal funds.
50
  An application for federal 
habeas corpus cannot be granted ―unless it appears that the applicant has 
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.‖51  Thus, a federal 
application cannot be filed until after the direct appeal and habeas petition in 
state court have been denied or rejected.  The federal petition must be filed 
within one year of the conclusion of the state direct appeal, but this period is 
stayed while a state habeas petition is pending. 
The likelihood of federal relief for state death row inmates increases in 
states that have high affirmance rates for death penalty appeals.  A national 
study conducted by Columbia University researchers examined the review of 
all death judgments from 1973 through 1995 and found that 59% were 
affirmed by state supreme courts.
52
  A more recent study of fourteen death 
penalty states from 1992 through 2002 reported an affirmance rate of 73.7% 
in death appeals.
53
  Since 1987, the California Supreme Court has affirmed 
death judgments at a rate in excess of 90% and denied state habeas relief at an 
even higher rate.
54
  The Columbia study found that 40% of death judgments 
reviewed on federal habeas corpus were set aside,
55
 and this number increased 
where the state courts had a higher affirmance rate than the national average.
56
  
―In California, 70% of habeas petitioners in death cases have achieved relief 
in the federal courts, even though relief was denied when the same claims 
were asserted in state courts.‖57  In most cases, relief was limited to reversal 
of the penalty phase.
58
  When federal courts have concluded that mitigating 
evidence that had not been investigated by trial counsel might have persuaded 
a jury to impose a life sentence rather than the death penalty, the likely 
explanations for this would include the availability of sufficient funds for 
investigation of the defendant‘s claims in federal court, the opportunity to 
develop a more comprehensive record at a federal evidentiary hearing, and the 
 
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2), (g) (2006). 
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). 
52. James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, at  
5–7 (June 12, 2000) (unpublished study), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/ 
instructionalservices/liebman/. 
53. Barry Latzer & James N.G. Cauthen, Justice Delayed? Time Consumption in Capital 
Appeals: A Multistate Study 23 (Mar. 2007) (unpublished study, on file with the National Criminal 
Justice Reference Service), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/app/Publications/ 
abstract.aspx?ID=239209. 
54. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 136. 
55. Liebman et al., supra note 52, at 6. 
56. Compare id. at 57 tbl.6 with id. at 62 tbl.7 (demonstrating that nine of the sixteen states 
with state court affirmance rates higher than the national average also were more likely to have their 
death judgments reversed on federal habeas corpus review). 
57. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 136. 
58. See id. at app. II.  
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greater independence of federal judges with lifetime appointments.
59
 
The average delay from the filing of an application for federal habeas 
relief in a California death case until the grant or denial of relief by a federal 
district judge is 6.2 years.
60
  If the federal petition includes claims that have 
not been exhausted in state court, the federal court can stay the proceedings or 
dismiss the petition while the defendant returns to state court to exhaust the 
remedies available in the state courts.
61
  This increases the delay in disposing 
of the federal habeas petition by two years.  Because California does not 
provide adequate resources to lawyers handling state habeas claims, 74% of 
federal habeas applications filed by California death row inmates are stayed 
for the exhaustion of state remedies.
62
  Thus, the underfunding of state habeas 
proceedings in California increases the burden on federal courts and delays 
the final resolution of death penalty reviews. 
The grant or denial of habeas relief by a federal district court in California 
can be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  
However, the average delay for appellate review, including a petition for 
en banc review and a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court is 4.2 
years.
63
 
Continuity of representation by the same lawyer in both state and federal 
habeas corpus proceedings helps to reduce the delays that now occur in state 
and federal habeas proceedings, especially where exhaustion of claims in state 
court is a problem.  With private appointed lawyers, however, continuity 
cannot be assured.  The appointment authority of the California Supreme 
Court only extends to state habeas proceedings.  Representation by HCRC, on 
the other hand, assures continuity of representation because the agency is 
available to accept federal appointments after the state proceedings are 
concluded, and the agency seeks to investigate and present all federal 
constitutional claims in state court before a federal petition is filed.  Thus, a 
return to state court for exhaustion of claims may be obviated.  Currently, 
only 7.3% of the habeas appointments of HCRC are for purposes of 
exhaustion, while 23.7% of the habeas appointments of private attorneys are 
for exhaustion purposes.  The Commission recommended that the unmet need 
for habeas counsel be met by expanding HCRC rather than expanding the 
number of appointments of private counsel.  This would address the need for 
 
59. Id. at 136. 
60. Id.  
61. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277–78 (2005). 
62. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 136–37 (citing Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for 
California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 697, 749 (2007)). 
63. Id.  
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continuity of counsel between state and federal habeas proceedings.
64
 
V.  THE NEED FOR GREATER RELIANCE ON PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
While we may be sorely tempted to dismiss the California experience as 
the unfortunate consequences of collective lunacy, there may be some 
valuable lessons for other states that struggle to stay abreast of death penalty 
appeals and habeas corpus proceedings.  While California presents the worst 
example, the problem of growing delays plagues every state that permits the 
death penalty.  The U.S. Department of Justice has tracked the elapsed time 
from sentence to execution for all defendants who have been executed in the 
U.S. since 1978.  The average time lapse has grown steadily throughout the 
U.S., from an average of 4.25 years during the period of 1977 to 1983 to an 
average of 12.25 years in 2005.
65
  Efforts to meet the need for qualified 
counsel to competently represent death row inmates should not rely upon the 
recruitment of private counsel to accept appointments to handle appeals and 
habeas corpus proceedings.  Handling these cases has become highly 
specialized, and the pool of lawyers who achieve the level of experience 
necessary to meet American Bar Association qualification standards is 
diminishing.  The frustration and burnout experienced by these lawyers lead 
them to spurn repeat appointments.  From both a practical and economic 
perspective, the development of public defender-type offices to meet the need 
for appointed counsel makes much more sense.  Such offices can provide a 
consistent level of oversight and training, and deliver backup and support with 
greater economy. 
The Commission recommended the expansion of both the State Public 
Defender and the HCRC to meet the need for appointed counsel to handle 
death penalty appeals and habeas corpus proceedings.  While this would add 
$95 million to the current cost of the administration of the death penalty in 
California, the Commission concluded it was the only practical alternative 
available to reduce the California delays to the level of the national average.
66
  
In the current economic climate, the appropriation of the necessary funds to 
meet this recommendation is highly unlikely.  The Commission noted that there 
are alternatives to avoid these costs.  First, a significant narrowing of the 
breadth of California‘s death penalty law could cut the number of death penalty 
cases in half.  Second, a replacement of the death penalty with sentences of life 
without possibility of parole would achieve substantial savings.
67
 
 
64. Id.  
65. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice,  
Capital Punishment, 2006: Statistical Tables, Time Under Sentence of Death and Execution, By 
Race, 1977–2006, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/cp/2006/tables/cp06st11.htm.  
66. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 116–17. 
67. Id. at 137. 
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The Commission took no official position on either of these alternatives.  
Although the Commission was unanimous in identifying the causes of 
dysfunction and the remedies needed to reduce delays in California at least to 
the national average of twelve years, many commissioners felt that the State 
of California would be better off saving the expenditures that would be 
required to fix the death penalty, and simply repealing the death penalty law.  
These positions emerged in the separate statements appended to the final 
report.  Eight commissioners signed a separate statement concluding that the 
death penalty should be repealed because its process and administration are 
inherently flawed, and the costs of fixing it are too high.
68
  Two of the 
commissioners who signed that statement joined two other commissioners in 
signing another statement suggesting the California death penalty law is 
―vastly overbroad,‖ and should either be narrowed or eliminated.69 
It currently appears that none of the Commission‘s recommendations with 
regard to the administration of California‘s death penalty law will be 
implemented.  In the first ten months of 2009, 25 more individuals were 
sentenced to death in California, increasing the size of our death row 
population to more than 800.  As noted in the separate statement of 
Commissioners Streeter, Ridolfi, Hersek, and Laurence: 
Chief Justice George did not elaborate on what he meant 
when he testified that the continued growth in the capital case 
backlog, if unchecked, will at some point cause the system to 
―collapse[] of its own weight.‖  But if the delays in our 
system continue to grow, it is not hard to envision, in legal 
terms, what could happen: The wholesale invalidation of 
capital punishment in California.
70
 
Quoting the opinion of Justice White in Furman v. Georgia, they noted 
his conclusion that, ―‗as the statutes before us are now administered, the 
penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too 
attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice.‘‖71 
VI.  NARROWING THE BREADTH OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW 
The Constitution Project, based in Washington, D.C., established a blue-
ribbon bipartisan commission of judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, elected 
officials, FBI and police officials, professors, and civic and religious leaders 
to examine the administration of the death penalty throughout the U.S.  The 
Constitution Project achieved broad consensus on two key recommendations 
 
68. Id. at 168–74. 
69. Id. at 174–81. 
70. Id. at 180. 
71. Id. at 181 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). 
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to reserve capital punishment for the most aggravated offenses and most 
culpable offenders:
72
 
―5. Death Penalty Eligibility Should Be Limited to Five 
Factors: 
The murder of a peace officer killed in the 
performance of his or her official duties when done to 
prevent or retaliate for that performance; 
The murder of any person (including but not limited to 
inmates, staff, and visitors) occurring at a correctional 
facility; 
The murder of two or more persons regardless of 
whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or 
of several related or unrelated acts, as long as either (a) the 
deaths were the result of an intent to kill more than one 
person, or (b) the defendant knew the act or acts would 
cause death or create a strong probability of death or great 
bodily harm to the murdered individuals or others; 
The intentional murder of a person involving the 
infliction of torture.  In this context, torture means the 
intentional and depraved infliction of extreme physical 
pain for a prolonged period of time before the victim‘s 
death; and depraved means that the defendant relished the 
infliction of extreme physical pain upon the victim, 
evidencing debasement or perversion, or that the defendant 
evidenced a sense of pleasure in the infliction of extreme 
physical pain; 
The murder by a person who is under investigation for, 
or who has been charged with or has been convicted of, a 
crime that would be a felony, or the murder of anyone 
involved in the investigation, prosecution, or defense of 
that crime, including, but not limited to, witnesses, jurors, 
judges, prosecutors, and investigators. 
6. Felony Murder Should Be Excluded as the Basis for Death 
Penalty Eligibility. 
The five eligibility factors in Recommendation 5, 
which are intended to be an exhaustive list of the only 
factors that may render a murderer eligible for capital 
punishment, do not include felony murder as a basis for 
imposing the death penalty.  To ensure that the death 
penalty is reserved for the most culpable offenders and to 
 
72. Id. at 138.  Much of the information in Parts VI & VII has been adapted directly from the 
Commission‘s Final Report.  For a more in-depth discussion, see id. at 138–44. 
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make the imposition of the death penalty more 
proportional, jurisdictions that nevertheless choose to go 
beyond these five eligibility factors should still exclude 
from death eligibility those cases in which eligibility is 
based solely upon felony murder.  Any jurisdiction that 
chooses to retain felony murder as a death penalty 
eligibility criterion should not permit using felony murder 
as an aggravating circumstance.‖73 
Similarly, the Illinois Governor‘s Commission on Capital Punishment—a 
bipartisan group of seventeen current or former prosecutors, defense lawyers, 
judges, and civic leaders established to determine what reforms would ensure 
that the Illinois capital punishment system is fair, just, and accurate—
unanimously concluded that the Illinois death penalty law should be narrowed 
to the functional equivalent of the Constitution Project recommendation:
74
 
[T]he current list of 20 factual circumstances under which a 
defendant is eligible for a death sentence should be eliminated 
in favor of a simpler and narrower group of eligibility criteria.  
A majority of the Commission agreed that the death penalty 
should be applied only in cases where the defendant has 
murdered two or more persons, or where the victim was either 
a police officer or a firefighter; or an officer or inmate of a 
correctional institution; or was murdered to obstruct the 
justice system; or was tortured in the course of the murder.
75
 
The Honorable Alex Kozinski, now presiding judge of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, suggested fifteen years ago that narrowing 
death penalty laws was the most appropriate way to address the illusory nature 
of the death penalty.
76
  Noting the growing gap between the number of people 
sentenced to death and the number we were actually willing to execute, he 
suggested decreasing the number of crimes punishable by death and the 
circumstances under which death may be imposed so that we only sentence to 
death ―the number of people we truly have the means and the will to 
execute.‖77  The goal of narrowing, then, is to limit the number of death row 
inmates to those whom we truly have the means and the will to execute.
78
 
 
73. Id. at 138–39 (quoting THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, MANDATORY JUSTICE: THE DEATH 
PENALTY REVISITED, at xxiv–xxv (2005)). 
74. Id. at 139.  
75. STATE OF ILL., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR‘S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, at ii 
(2002).  
76. Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-on Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 1, 3, 29–31 (1995). 
77. Id. at 29–31. 
78. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 139.  
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The California Commission undertook a comprehensive review to 
determine which special circumstances were found in all cases in which the 
death penalty was imposed in California from 1978 through 2007.  Despite 
the difficulties in gathering data because of the lack of a systematic data 
reporting requirement in California, the researchers, led by Professor Ellen 
Kreitzberg of Santa Clara University School of Law, were able to locate 822 
death penalty judgments and identify the special circumstances utilized in all 
but 26 of these cases.  They concluded that since 1978, one of the five special 
circumstances identified by the Constitution Project was found in 55% of 
California death cases, or a total of 451 of the cases examined.  This means 
that if the California death penalty law had been limited to the ―worst of the 
worst‖ as identified by the Constitution Project and the Illinois Commission, 
there would be approximately 368 inmates on death row, rather than 670.  The 
researchers also analyzed trends in the use of California‘s special 
circumstances over time.  They found that there is a growing trend to narrow 
the use of special circumstances to the five that were identified in the 
Constitution Project‘s Mandatory Justice report:79 
Our analysis of the special circumstances found by juries 
in California death penalty cases[] shows a growing trend in 
the percentage of cases where at least one Mandatory Justice 
factor is found.  Compare 1980 where only 37% of the cases 
that year had at least one Mandatory Justice factor with 2007 
where 79% of the cases had at least one factor.  Since 1998, a 
Mandatory Justice factor has been found in at least 59% of 
the cases each year—most years over 65% of the total cases.  
However, there is significant disparity from county to county 
with several counties falling far below the state average.  
California needs to determine how to eliminate these 
geographic disparities in the imposition of the death penalty.
80
 
Thus, a narrowing of the California special circumstances to the five 
factors recommended by Mandatory Justice and the Illinois Commission 
could largely eliminate the geographic variation in use of the death penalty.
81
 
If California‘s death penalty law were narrowed, it would be unwise to 
proceed with the execution of defendants whose death judgment was not 
based upon one of the identified special circumstances.  With respect to the 
thirteen executions conducted by California since 1978, ten of them would 
have met the recommended special circumstance for multiple murders.  Only 
 
79. Id. 
80. ELLEN KREITZBERG, A REVIEW OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN CALIFORNIA DEATH 
PENALTY CASES 10 (2008). 
81. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 140.  
510 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:495 
the executions of Thomas M. Thompson, Manuel Babbitt, and Stephen 
Wayne Anderson would not have resulted in a death sentence using the 
Mandatory Justice factors.  The death sentence of any death row inmate 
whose conviction did not include a finding of one or more of the enumerated 
special circumstances could be commuted to a sentence of life without 
possibility of parole.  Taking this step would actually have little impact for the 
death row inmates involved.  Most of them will never be executed, but will 
die in prison.  Changing their sentence to one of lifetime incarceration would 
change only the location in which they will serve their sentence.  But just that 
change could save the State of California $27 million each year over the 
current cost of confining these prisoners on death row.
82
 
With regard to the future growth of California‘s death row, the Kreitzberg 
study suggests that from 2003 to 2007, more than 70% of the new death 
judgments in California have included at least one of the recommended 
circumstances.
83
  Thus, an average of eleven or twelve new death judgments 
each year could be anticipated if prosecutors seek the death penalty at the 
same rate.  The numbers, both in terms of backlog and new judgments, could 
be managed with substantially less resources than we currently devote to our 
death penalty system.  The cost of implementing the reforms recommended by 
the Commission to fix the current system would be reduced by 30% to 40%.
84
 
VII.  REPLACING THE DEATH PENALTY WITH LIFE WITHOUT  
PAROLE SENTENCES 
After a comprehensive review of the costs and benefits of the death 
penalty, the New Jersey Death Penalty Commission concluded that: 
(1) There is no compelling evidence that the . . . death 
penalty rationally serves a legitimate penological intent. 
(2) The costs of the death penalty are greater than the 
costs of life in prison without parole . . . . 
(3) There is increasing evidence that the death penalty is 
inconsistent with evolving standards of decency. 
. . . . 
(6) The penological interest in executing a small number 
of persons . . . is not sufficiently compelling to justify the risk 
of making an irreversible mistake. 
(7) The alternative of life imprisonment in a maximum 
 
82. Id. at 141. 
83. See KREITZBERG, supra note 80, at 38 tbl.d7 (calculating that four of the five special 
circumstances proposed by the Mandatory Justice report were present in 72.2% of new death 
judgments, or sixty out of eighty-three cases, from 2003 to 2007). 
84. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 142. 
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security institution without the possibility of parole would 
sufficiently ensure public safety and address other legitimate 
social and penological interests, including the interests of the 
families of murder victims. 
(8) Sufficient funds should be dedicated to ensure 
adequate services and advocacy for [victims‘] families . . . .85 
These considerations led the State of New Jersey to abolish the death 
penalty in 2007, in favor of the alternative of life imprisonment without parole 
(LWOP).
86
  A similar step was taken by the State of New Mexico in 2008, for 
the same reasons.  The same alternative is available in California, although in 
California this step would have to be approved by the voters.
87
 
California has had a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole available since 1978.  According to the California Department of 
Corrections, as of January 1, 2008, 3,622 defendants were serving LWOP 
sentences, including some who were initially charged in death penalty cases.  
Thus, throughout the past thirty years, we have increased our LWOP 
population at an average rate of 120 defendants per year.  If the death penalty 
were replaced with LWOP sentences, not only would the costs of confinement 
be significantly reduced, but many of the costs of trial and appellate review 
for death cases would be eliminated as well.
88
 
At the trial level, substantial savings would result from the elimination of 
the necessity for death-qualified juries.  In Los Angeles County, 800 potential 
jurors may be summoned for a death penalty case.
89
  California jury 
commissioners rely solely upon voter registration and Department of Motor 
Vehicles lists to summon jurors, although state law permits expansion of 
source lists.
90
  Seventy-five percent of potential jurors will be excused for 
financial hardship because of the length of the trial.  California courts pay 
jurors at a rate of $15 per day.
91
  Many employers do not pay employees for 
jury service, and those who do frequently limit the payment to no more than 
two weeks.  The remaining jurors must undergo individual questioning to 
determine whether they have opinions about the death penalty that would 
 
85. NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION REPORT 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc_final.pdf.  
86. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 142. 
87. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
88. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 142. 
89. Id. at 143. 
90. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 197(a) (West 2008).  In contrast, New York uses five source lists, 
including lists of state income taxpayers and state unemployment and welfare recipients.  FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 142 n.96 (citation omitted). 
91. At least thirty-one states and the federal courts pay jurors more than California.  In federal 
courts, jurors receive $50 per day.  Id. at 143 n.97 (citation omitted). 
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preclude their serving in a death case.  This process of ―death qualification‖ 
has resulted in larger numbers of potential jurors being excused as public 
opinion against the death penalty has grown.
92
 
While a jury is normally selected in one or two days in most felony cases, 
the selection of a death-qualified jury normally takes eight to ten days of court 
time.  The use of limited source lists, the exclusion of a higher proportion of 
potential jurors for economic hardship, together with the exclusion of those 
who disapprove of the death penalty, results in juries that do not reflect a 
cross section of the community to the extent that non-death juries do.
93
 
Upon conviction of first-degree murder and a finding of at least one 
special circumstance, the same jury is required to return for a second trial—
the penalty phase in which the jury decides between a sentence of death or a 
sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole.  This is a full trial, 
with opening statements, presentation of evidence by both sides, closing 
arguments, and jury instructions.  The jury is asked to weigh aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, and impose a sentence of death if aggravating 
circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, or a sentence of life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole if mitigating circumstances 
outweigh aggravating circumstances.  The jury must unanimously agree as to 
the penalty; if the jurors are unable to achieve unanimity, another jury must be 
impaneled to decide the penalty.
94
 
The expenses for trial and appellate counsel would also be substantially 
reduced if lifetime incarceration became the maximum penalty in California.  
Only one defense lawyer would have to be appointed for the trial.  There 
would be no automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court, so appeals 
would be handled much more expeditiously by the courts of appeal.  Between 
June 2005 and June 2006, the California Courts of Appeal decided 100 
LWOP appeals after an average delay of 18.6 months.
95
  While habeas corpus 
petitions are available, there is no right to appointed counsel, as there is for 
appeals and for habeas petitions in death cases.  And because there is no 
discretion in the exercise of the sentencing function, there is no issue 
regarding the adequacy of investigation of mitigating evidence or the effective 
assistance of counsel at a sentencing trial.  Finally, although the risks of 
wrongful convictions remain, there would be no wrongful executions.  New 
trials could be ordered if necessary, and the exonerated would be released.
96
 
If the New Jersey/New Mexico approach were used in California, the 
 
92. Id. at 143. 
93. Id. 
94. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(b) (West 2008). 
95. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 143 (citing Alarcón, supra note 62, at 731). 
96. Id. at 143. 
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death penalty backlog would immediately disappear.  The issues being 
litigated in direct appeals and habeas petitions would no longer have to be 
decided by the California Supreme Court.  Penalty issues would not have to 
be decided at all.  Forty death penalty trials each year would simply be added 
to the existing schedule of LWOP cases; instead of 120 LWOP cases per year, 
there would be 160.
97
 
With a dysfunctional death penalty law, the reality is that most California 
death sentences are actually sentences of lifetime incarceration.  The 
defendant is more likely to die in prison rather than by execution.  The same 
result can be achieved at a savings of well over $100 million by sentencing 
the defendant to lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole.
98
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
California‘s death penalty law is completely dysfunctional.  It offers the 
families of crime victims only the unrelenting cruelty of endless delays.  It 
quadruples the cost to California taxpayers for the confinement of offenders 
for what are actually life sentences.  The vast majority of those sentenced to 
death in California will die in prison before they are ever executed.  The 
system is also unfair to defendants with plausible claims of prejudicial error in 
their trials or sentencing proceedings.  Of the fifty-four California death cases 
that have been resolved with finality in the federal courts, thirty-eight of them, 
or 70%, have resulted in the grant of some relief despite the rulings of the 
California Supreme Court upholding the convictions and sentences.
99
  
Twenty-four of them have been sent back to the California courts for penalty 
retrials, to be followed by another round of direct appeal and habeas 
proceedings.  Fourteen of them had their underlying convictions set aside.  
The delays in reaching these conclusions often impose serious prejudice upon 
the defendant.   
No one wins when a state‘s dispensation of justice becomes dysfunctional.  
Respect for the justice system is only diminished.  California Chief Justice 
Ronald M. George warned the California Commission on the Fair 
Administration of Justice that if nothing is done, the backlogs in 
postconviction proceedings will continue to grow ―until the system falls of its 
own weight.‖100  The Commission itself warned the legislature that doing 
nothing would be the worst possible course.  Both warnings have gone 
unheeded.  While some opponents of the death penalty might welcome the 
 
97. Id. at 143–44. 
98. Id. at 144.  
99. See id. at 136. 
100. Testimony Before the Comm‘n on the Fair Admin. of Justice 38 (2008) (statement of 
Ronald M. George, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of California), available at 
http://www.ccfaj.org.documents/reports/dp/expert/Chief‘s%20Testimony.pdf.   
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collapse of the machinery of death, the consequences of such a collapse would 
reach far beyond the fate of those on California‘s death row.  The failure of 
California‘s death penalty law will create cynicism and disrespect for the rule 
of law, produce even greater havoc in the correctional system, and undermine 
public respect for judges, legislators, and police. 
 
 
 
